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INDECENT EXPOSURE: GENES ARE MORE THAN A
BRAND NAME LABEL IN THE DNA DATABASE DEBATE
By: Jessica D. Gabel*

"[T]his is perhaps the most important criminal procedure case that
this court has heard in decades ... [l]ots of murders, lots of rapes that
can be solved using this new technology that involves a very minimal
intrusion on personal privacy."l Few can argue with the message that
DNA saves lives,2 and that message is used time and again to justify
the continued bloat of DNA databases. Saving lives and solving
cases are the intended outcomes of the creation of DNA databases,
but even with such laudable goals there are unintended-yet
predictable-consequences. 3 In 1986, Donald Reynolds and Billy
Wardell were convicted of raping a student in Illinois.4 They spent
eleven years in prison before being exonerated based on newly
analyzed DNA evidence recovered from the crime scene. 5 Although
they were released from prison and cleared of any wrongdoing, both
Reynolds and Wardell may be labeled sex offenders for the rest of
their lives. 6 Prior to the new code section addressing expungement,
effective January 1, 2013, Illinois law required that all DNA profiles
collected from sex offenders "shall be maintained in a single database

*

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to
thank my two fearless research assistants, Ashley Champion and Kimberly Reeves,
who made this article (and many others) possible. I also would like to thank Elizabeth
Hornbrook for her fabulous work on the final edits to this article.
Justice Samuel Alito. Transcript of Oral Argument Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1
(2012) (No. 12-207 13).
See DNA Saves, KATIESLAW.ORG, http://katieslaw.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2013)
(advocating for DNA collection at the time of processing for arrestees in order to
solve crimes faster).
Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal
DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MEn. & ETHICS 209, 211, 214 (2000); Bonnie Taylor,
Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted Persons & the Debate over DNA Database
Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 509, 512, 515 (2003).
See Michelle Hibbert, State and Federal DNA Database Laws Examined, PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/revolutionldatabases.html(last
visited Jan. 22,2013).
Id. "[AJ DNA artifact recovered from the crime scene was analyzed in a Maryland
lab, and it proved that the semen was neither Reynold's nor Wardell's." Jd.
Id.
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and may not be subject to expungement.,,7 The new expungement
provision does not claim to be retroactive, so it is unlikely that it
would be helpful for Reynolds and Wardell. Thus, it appears that
"their [DNA] profiles do not necessarily have to be purged from the
system."g
Despite the previous policies of Illinois and other states that do not
explicitly require expungement at all, many states require both the
expungement of the profile and the destruction of the corresponding
DNA sample collected from wrongfully convicted offenders. 9 The
Maryland DNA collection statute, for example, requires both the
DNA sample and profile to be expunged once the defendant's
conviction has been overturned; however, the statute requires that
identifying information be expunged from "every data base into
which it has been entered, including local, State, and federal data
bases."iO Poor drafting of these laws, however, may lead to problems
down the road. For example, the expungement provisions of some
state statutes require that samples be expunged from the state DNA
databanks. II Because many state databanks link to the federal
database, this wording leaves open a loophole that could allow the
DNA profile to remain in either the national or the local system. 12
Further, the laws of Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, and Wyoming
require only expungement of the DNA record from the database; they
do not require the destruction of the DNA samples themselves. 13
Of course, the tempting rationalization to make is that these
glitches in the system are acceptable for the greater good. This is not
to say that DNA databases are not useful. Indeed, DNA database hits
have been instrumental in linking criminals to prior unsolved crimes
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

ld. (citing 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3(t) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999». The new
code section allows for expungement, but only where "that pardon document
specifically states that the reason for the pardon is the actual innocence of an
individual." 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. S/5-4-3(f-l) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
Hibbert, supra note 4.
ld.; see also, e.g., infra note 10.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-Sll(c) (LexisNexis 2011).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713(i); HAW. REv. STAT. § 844D-71(a); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15:614; NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4109; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-SA-29.
Although Maryland considered adopting this "statewide" language, the current code
section requires expungement of the DNA record from all databases-including local
and federal databases-that contain the record once a conviction is reversed on
grounds of actual innocence. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-SII(c) (LexisNexis
2011).
Hibbert, supra note 4.
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 1577(4) (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § IS (West
2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-107 (2011); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-40S (2011);
Hibbert, supra note 4.
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and bringing closure to many victims and families. For example,
New York police uncovered a serial rapist in July 2012, after a DNA
sample in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS) matched evidence from a twenty-five-yearold rape case. 14 William Joseph Trice was convicted in 2010
for raping an Annapolis, Maryland woman in 1988. 15 After police
received information indicating that DNA profiles from two of their
cold cases matched a profile in CODIS, they reviewed evidence from
the 1988 Annapolis rape case. 16 A fingerprint recovered from the
scene was matched to Trice, whose prints were in the latent
fingerprint database. 17 Trice was tried and convicted of the
Annapolis rape in January 2010, and was also linked to the December
1988 rape of a 42-year-old woman. 18 Further, as recently as July
2012, Trice was linked to the 1987 rape of yet another woman, and
State's Attorney Frank Weathersbee is "encouraging jurisdictions in
the surrounding area with unsolved rapes from the mid to late 1980s
to review the evidence and determine whether a DNA profile can be
run for a CODIS match.,,19
One would be hard pressed to argue with such success. However,
is being wrongly labeled a sex offender for life and having one's
DNA forever on file, susceptible to database trawls, an acceptable
consequence of solving crimes and closing cases? The criminal
justice system has, by and large, answered this question
affirmative1y.20 It is part of the "game of consequences,,21 upon
which the system feasts.
While that question deserves more
discussion, it is only one of many issues-too many to address in this
article-that are omnipresent in the DNA database discussion.

14.

IS.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

21.

Tamika Smith, DNA Evidence Solves Third Cold Rape Case, ANNAPOLIS PATCH (July
24, 2012), http://annapolis.patch.comlarticles/dna-evidence-solves-third-cold-rapecase.
Jd.

ld.
ld.
ld. "Trice committed suicide by hanging himself in his jail cell six days after his
conviction." Jd.
ld.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West Supp. 2013); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
17.175(1) (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAfETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-610 (2007).
ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, Old Mortality, in MEMORIES AND PORTRAITS ch. 3 (1912),
available at http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.auls/stevensonirobert_louis/s848mp/index.html
(last updated Nov. 12,2012,7:25 PM).
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I. DNA DATABASES: THE EMPEROR'S NEW KLUGES 22
In the family tree of criminal investigations, DNA is no longer the
awkward, misunderstood cousin to fingerprints. Rather, DNA has
moved to the forefront of identification, and is often associated with
the term "gold standard. ,,23 Still in its infancy stage in the 1990s, the
use of DNA in criminal cases has exploded over the past twenty
years. 24 No longer reserved for sexual assault and homicide cases,
DNA has found a foothold in even lowly property crime
investigations. 25 Because of its power for precision and accuracy in
the identification of suspects, DNA quickly became the focal point of
a broad-scale offender database, capable of linking suspects to the
previously unsolved crimes they comrnitted. 26
To be sure, it would be hard to either discount or deny the obvious
benefits that have accrued with the proliferation of DNA databases.
CODIS went live in 1998, and is now the epicenter of many criminal
investigations on the local, state, and national levels. 27 The advent of
DNA databases is not a surprising one. With the expansion of DNA
22.

23.
24.

25.

26.
27.

A kluge is computer slang for "a software or hardware configuration that, while
inelegant, inefficient, clumsy, or patched together, succeeds in solving a specific
problem or performing a
particular task."
Kluge, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.comibrowselkluge?s=t (last visited Jan. 22,2013).
E.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law
Enforcement Control ofScientijic Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 53,58 (2011).
See Karen J. Maschke, DNA and Law Enforcement, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS, 45, 45-46 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008),
available at http://www.thehastingscenter.orgipublicationslbriefingbooklDefauIt.aspx.
See, e.g., Joseph Blozis, Using DNA to Fight Property Crime, EVIDENCE TECH MAG.,
http://www.evidencemagazine.comlindex. php?option=com_ content&task=view&id= 1
031 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). In an effort to address staffing problems that have
created a huge evidence backlog, the City of Oakland Police department has
significantly decreased the number of fingerprints it takes from crime scenes and has
begun to rely much more heavily on DNA profiles to solve crimes, though their DNA
backlog is also significant. See Jesse Douglas Allen-Taylor, City Seeks Solutions to
Crime Investigations Backlog, POST NEWSPAPER GROUP (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://www.postnewsgroup.comlpublishedcontentl20 12/081 14/city-seeks-solutions-tocrime-investigations-backlogl.
Maschke, supra note 24, at 45.
CaDIS is the acronym for the "Combined DNA Index System" and is the generic
term used to describe the FBI's program of support for criminal justice DNA
databases as well as the software used to run these databases. Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
(last visited Jan. 22, 2013). The National DNA Index System (NDIS) is one part of
CaDIS containing the DNA profiles contributed by federal, state, and local
participating forensic laboratories. Id.
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evidence in criminal cases, the writing was on the wall: the criminal
justice system needed to warehouse and recall the DNA profiles of
offenders and profiles from unsolved cases. 28
CODIS stockpiles DNA profile records entered by local, state, and
federal law enforcement agencies. 29 Constructed upon a set of
thirteen randomly selected genetic markers, "CODIS draws from two
indices: DNA profiles of individuals (mostly convicted offenders)
and the other containing unidentified DNA from crime scenes. ,,30 As
it pertains to federal offenders, the DNA Act, and its later
amendments, requires collection of DNA samples from those
convicted of, among other things, any felony or crime of violence,
certain sexual offenses, and conspiracy to commit those crimes. 31 In
2005, the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 expanded the pool of
"offenders" to include DNA samples from federal arrestees. 32
Not to be left in the dust, all fifty states now have similar
provisions that establish DNA databases and mandate collection of
samples from offenders, but the list of suspects is anything but
usual. 33 While databases were initially intended to store the profiles
of sex offenders and other violent criminals-and some states do
restrict the offender index to those individuals-state DNA databases
have swelled to include those convicted of misdemeanor crimes. 34
While the list of collectible offenses has multiplied, states also have
begun to follow the federal practice of collecting samples from
28.

29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

34.

See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale
Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 13 (2010) (explaining that
CODIS was created to centralize and coordinate the myriad national, state, and local
DNA databases that had begun to emerge in an effort to "foster the exchange and
comparison of forensic DNA evidence from violent crime investigations" and that the
"DNA Identification Act ('DNA Act') authorized the FBI to create the National DNA
Index System ('NDIS') in 1994").
Id.
Id. at 14.
42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1 )(b), (d) (2006). The majority of DNA profiles stored in the
national database are those of convicted felons who have served time for crimes such
as assault and battery, rape, murder, and robbery, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lablbiometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited
Feb. 6, 2013), but the DNA Act now provides for DNA coIlection from individuals on
probation, parole, and supervised release for federal offenses. 42 U.S.C. §
14135a(a)(2) (2006).
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, sec. 1004, § 14135a, 119 Stat.
2960,3085 (2006) (amended 42 U.S.C. § 14135a).
Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J., Nov. 2009, at 9,
10, available at https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnijl228381.pdf.
Id.
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arrestees. 35 Currently, twenty-eight states and the federal government
actively collect DNA samples from arrestees and add them to the
offender index. 36 Should the charges be dismissed or the government
otherwise fail to obtain a conviction, the DNA profile (and the
sample from which it came) may be left in a legal vacuum. 37
The majority of the states that permit arrestee collection put the
onus on the individual to affirmatively seek destruction of the sample
and expungement of the profile. 38 But if that profile has already been
uploaded into CODIS and added to the national database, then it will
remain there indefinitely, regardless of what happens at the state
level. 39 The profile may also remain in a local database if there is no
provision for removal from all DNA repositories. In contrast to the
prevailing trend of placing the burden on the arrestee to request
expungement, Maryland is one of only a handful of states that
affirmatively requires the state to destroy the sample and eliminate
the profile from the state database. 4o Maryland law includes the
corresponding duty to eliminate the profile if it has found its way into
the national database maintained by the FBI.41 With the passage of
Maryland HB 292 and removal of the sunset provision, section 2511 (c) does now appear to require removal of the profile from local,
state, and federal databases. 42
Still, with the ambitious and nearly-unfettered expansion of DNA
databases, it is perhaps not surprising that it raises privacy concerns,
and relatedly, Fourth Amendment concerns. 43 This article, however,
is not about the Fourth Amendment. Nor is it about privacy. This
article focuses on an issue that, in my view, is all too often given
short shrift in the DNA database debate: the collection of DNA is
about more than just putting genetic material into a barcode format.

35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.

43.

ld. at 9-11.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT'L INST. OF
JUST. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://nij .gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dnalcollection-fromarrestees.htm.
See Berson, supra note 33, at 11.

ld.
See id. (noting independent federal requirements for expungement); DNA Sample
Collection from Arrestees, supra note 36.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(c) (LexisNexis 2011). See Berson, supra note
33, at 11 (noting that under the federal statute a person must affirmatively request
expungement); Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest
Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 767, 810 (1999).
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(c) (LexisNexis 2011).
E.g., Berson, supra note 33, at 11-13.
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Courts, time and again, liken DNA profiles to fingerprints44 or license
plates,45 but the information gleaned from a sample is so much more.
As we continue the expansion of DNA collection in this country to
include more offenders and arrestees, and quite possibly those outside
of the criminal justice system, we should consider the broader
implications of warehousing our genetic material.
II.

A FALLACY IN THE ANALOGY: DNA IS MORE THAN A
FINGERPRINT

Infallibility. DNA was perhaps preordained to receive this label.
Unlike any other type of forensic analysis that preceded it, DNA
finally approached the unrealized Holy Grail in prosecutions:
certainty. 46 From its inception, the true believers have proclaimed
DNA analysis to be the criminal justice equivalent of the second
coming. The courts have grasped this rhetoric with the gusto of a
cult-like following.47 The public perception of DNA is no different.
After all, DNA has the power to free the innocent and to condemn the
guilty. Popular culture hits such as CSI and Law & Order tell us that
the smallest sample-a drop of sweat inside a baseball cap or saliva
on chewing gum-will bring the wrongdoer to justice. 48
With that insatiable desire for certainty, our unwavering faith in
DNA has made us blind to both the shortcomings of DNA evidence
and the true nature of what DNA is.49 In effect, we have been
desensitized to the use of our genetic material as a crime-fighting
44.
45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 409-10 (3d Cir. 2011) (colIecting
cases), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).
See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 531 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Finding
Beverly'S [DNA] at the crime scene is essentialIy equivalent to finding that the last
two digits of a license plate of a car owned by defendant matched the last two
numbers of a license plate of a getaway car. ").
See William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing,
GENEWATCH,
Nov.-DEC.
2008,
5,
5,
available
at
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org!/pageDocuments/AJWLK 7M IAV. pdf.
See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410 (asserting "that a DNA profile is used solely as an
accurate, unique, identitying marker-in other words, as fingerprints for the twentyfirst century"); State v. Raines, 381 Md. 1,25, 857 A.2d 19,25 (2004) (finding that
"[t]he DNA profile thus serves the purpose of increasing the efficiency and accuracy
in identifying individuals within a certain class of convicted criminals" and thus,
"[t]he purpose is akin to that of a fingerprint").
See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About
Forensic Science Affects the Public's Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47
JURIMETRICS J. 357, 363 (2007) (reporting differences among regular viewers of
television programs focusing on forensic science and non-viewers).
See Thompson, supra note 46, at 5-6.
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tool. Notions of infallibility breed acquiescence, and it has fueled
and facilitated the development of DNA databases. 5o
Given DNA's rock-star status, it is not surprising that its
infallibility has become an almost unassailable assumption. 51 While I
have severe reservations over the perceived infallibility of the DNA
"truth machine," I want to suspend that particular argument for the
purposes of this article and instead focus on the prevailing notion
among courts that DNA is somehow analogous to fingerprints in
terms of the information gathered and the "inconvenience" visited
upon suspects. 52 This issue is generally housed in the ongoing (and
perhaps evolving) notions of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
A. That Pesky Fourth Amendment

I do not pretend to be a Fourth Amendment scholar. In fact, I
perhaps embody some of the "Luddite approach" to Fourth
Amendment interpretation that the Ninth Circuit scowled at in
Haskell,53 and that the dissent trumpeted in King v. State. 54
Nonetheless, to fully appreciate the DNA-fingerprint analogy, some
consideration must be paid to the Fourth Amendment (just not the
next forty pages).
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects
individuals from those searches and seizures that are
"unreasonable.,,55
Much of the debate surrounding the
constitutionality of DNA databases focuses on the acquisition of the
samples that comprise the database itself. 56 These samples are
obtained and often analyzed by law enforcement officers, thus raising
Fourth Amendment concerns. 57 Specifically, many of those opposed
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

ld. at 5.
See Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 48, at 357-58. The subjective nature of DNA
analysis creates a risk for "false matches and wrongful convictions." Brief of 14
Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25,
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046.
See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410-11 (concluding that a DNA profile is akin to a
simple fingerprint, which is a minimally intrusive method of identification).
Haskell v. Harris, 669 FJd 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), reh'g en banc granted, 686
FJd 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 611-12, 42 A.3d 549, 586 (2012) (Barbera, J.,
dissenting), cert granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See DNA and the Fourth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.coml20 12/08/06/opinionJdna-and-the-fourthamendment.html?_ r=O.
See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406-13 (discussing the privacy interests implicated when
DNA is extracted from an individual).

2013]

Indecent Exposure

569

to the practice of obtaining samples from arrestees prior to conviction
rely on the judicially created right of privacy, grounded in the
language of the Fourth Amendment. 58 It provides that "rtlhe right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.,,59
Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence required an actual physical
invasion into one of the enumerated categories in the Amendment in
order to find a search occurred. 60 But the 1967 case of Katz v. United
States changed that standard when the Court held that recording
conversations that took place inside a phone booth constituted a
search. 61 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion laid out a two-prong
test to determine whether a search has occurred for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 62 First, the court must ask whether the
defendant subjectively had an actual expectation of privacy. 63
Second, the court must ask whether "society is prepared to recognize
[that expectation] as 'reasonable.",64
The second prong has been the most problematic, particularly in
the face of ever-evolving technology.65 As technology advances and
the line between public and private places blurs, societal recognition
of an expectation of privacy as reasonable becomes more and more
58.

59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See, e.g., DNA and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 56 (explaining that proponents
of the practice argue that it is minimally intrusive, while opponents argue it can only
be performed with a warrant and is thus a violation of an arrestee's Fourth
Amendment privacy rights).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (finding a Fourth
Amendment violation when a spike-mike placed by agents made contact with a
heating duct in the wall of the defendant's row house because the touching constituted
a physical intrusion into the defendant's home); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 135 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (refusing to
fmd a Fourth Amendment violation because there was no physical invasion when
agents used a microphone, placed into adjoining walls, to overhear defendant's
conversations in his office); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928),
overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (finding that wiretapping was not covered by the
Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a physical intrusion into the defendant's
home, property, or person).
Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (concluding that use of a
thermal imaging device to detect heat radiating from a house is a "search" in part
because "the technology in question is not in general public use"); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 213-14 (1986) (holding that an expectation of privacy in
a home's backyard is unreasonable as it can be observed from an aircraft).
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difficult to discem. 66 For example, the Supreme Court recently
decided a case involving law enforcement's warrantless use of GPS
tracking devices. 67 In United States v. Jones, the defendant was
convicted of drug trafficking based in part on evidence obtained from
a GPS tracking device FBI agents attached to his vehicle. 68 The
Court held that attaching the device to the defendant's car amounted
to a search, triggering Fourth Amendment protections, and further,
because the FBI agents did not have a warrant at the time the device
was attached, the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated. 69 Five Justices on the Court focused on the physical
intrusion upon the defendant's property.70
It is easy to analogize DNA to Jones. Indeed, DNA constitutes the
very essence of an individual and it is difficult to imagine a more
intimate physical intrusion upon one's person. Even under the preKatz standard, taking a DNA sample without consent from a
defendant would obviously constitute a search. 71 Yet states and even
the federal government continue to pass and enforce laws mandating
that DNA samples be taken from the arrestees of certain crimes. 72
The argument often made is that the defendant has a subjective
expectation of privacy concerning his genetic material, but that
expectation is not one society is prepared to accept as reasonable. 73
In fact, this is the very argument the government made in Jones-that
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while
traversing the public roads. 74 That argument failed, largely because
66.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.

67.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,948 (2012).

68.
69.
70.

Id. at 948-49.
Id. at 945-54.
Id. at 949.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (concluding that drawing

71.

blood from the body is a "search" because it is a physical intrusion).

72.

73.

74.

E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 296, 296.1 (West 2008); see also DNA Sample Collection
from Arrestees, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dnai
collection-frorn-arrestees.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). Some states, such as
California, require that DNA samples be obtained from arrestees charged with any
felony, while other states, such as Michigan, limit the triggering offenses to violent
crimes and sex crimes. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 296, 296.1, invalidated by
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753,755 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), modified Aug.
31, 2011, cert. granted and vacated, 292 P .3d 854 (Cal. 2011), and CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 299 (West 2012), with MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.520m (West 2004 & Supp.
2012).
See Williamson V. State, 413 Md. 521, 529-30 (2010) (referring to the judge's
statement in a suppression hearing that society certainly would not accept as
reasonable the defendant's stated expectation of privacy in his genetic material).
Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 950.
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the agents in that case did not have a valid warrant when they
installed the device on Jones's car. 75
Similarly, most of the time officers do not have a warrant to obtain
a DNA sample from an arrestee, yet courts have continued to uphold
laws mandating that DNA samples be taken from certain arrestees. 76
While some argue that the police have the probable cause necessary
to make the arrest in the first place and that should carry the day, that
initial probable cause does not extend to the second use of the sample
once it enters the database and the subsequent comparison to samples
entered from cold cases. 77 As discussed above, this article does not
seek to hash out the Fourth Amendment arguments, rather it seeks to
explore the implicit balancing test occurring in courts today: the
comparison of the government's interest in solving cold cases versus
the interest of arrestees in keeping their genetic profiles private.
In Jones, the Court concluded that the government's interest in
using GPS technology to track a known drug trafficker was not
sufficient to permit the physical intrusion on his property-his
vehicle-without Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 78 Following the
Court's reasoning in Jones, it is difficult to justify allowing the
mandatory collection of DNA samples from certain arrestees.
Proponents of the practice claim that DNA is used-like
fingerprints-as a means of identification. 79 That comparison is
inaccurate and dangerous. 8o Proponents further point to the ability to
solve previously unsolvable crimes involving rape and murder. 81 But
should the gravity of the crime in question play any role in the
Court's constitutional analysis? It did not in Jones. Jones and his
accomplices where charged with possession with the intent to
75.
76.

77.

78.
79.
80.
8!.

Id. at 947,952.
See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2012), reh 'g en banc granted,
686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that California's DNA Act requiring law
enforcement officers to collect DNA from all adults arrested for felonies does not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
See United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658, 674 (D. Md. 2009), ajJ'd, 690 F.3d
226 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing a defense expert who explained the difference between
cold hits and probable cause).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947,952,954.
See discussion supra note 44 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part II.B-D.
See, e.g., Kate Alit, DNA Technology Helps Solve 38-Year-Old Cold Case,
HEARTLAND
CONNECTION
(Nov.
14,
2012,
3:45
PM),
http://www.heartlandconnection.com/news/story.aspx?id=825423#.UPtyGRlEQXc
(chronicling the arrest of a murder suspect after evidence from the crime was reexamined).
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distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine after the GPS evidence
linked him to a house where a stash consisting of $850,000 in cash,
ninety-seven grams of cocaine, and one kilogram of cocaine base
were discovered. 82 Jones himself was sentenced to life in prison after
his conviction. 83 Although the crime Jones was convicted of was
very serious, its gravity did not appear to play any role in the Court's
holding that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the
warrantless search. 84
As indicated by the disparate treatment of GPS cases like Jones and
challenges to laws mandating the procurement of DNA samples from
arrestees, there is an implicit balancing test occurring in COurtS. 85 The
analogy of DNA to fingerprints is the fiction that allows this
disparate treatment to continue. 86 It appears to be driven by the belief
that the government's interest in solving cold cases with DNA
evidence trumps individual privacy rights. 87 This is the often
overlooked argument this article seeks to address and dispel.

B. The Print Edition
"[Once] a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest.,,88 The rationale behind
this view is the fact that the identification of suspects is "relevant not
only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also
for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future
crimes."S9 This same reasoning has extended from fingerprints to the
collection of DNA upon arrest. 90 The justification for this routinely
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948-49.
Id. at 949.
See id. at 949-956 (explaining that the court's analysis does not make mention of the
gravity of Jones' conviction).
Compare id. at 947, 949, 952 (holding that the government's interest in tracking a
drug trafficker was not enough to justify the government's trespass on the defendant's
vehicle to install a GPS), with Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1050-51 (9th Cir.
2012), reh 'g en bane granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding California's
mandatory DNA collection law).
See infra Part II.B.
See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652,671 (2d Cir. 2005); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302,306 (4th Cir. 1992).
Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.
Id.; see a/so Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1972 (2013); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Va. 2000).
See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 106-900, pt. I, at 10 (2000). The House Report justified the
need to expedite analysis of DNA samples because a "backlog" of samples resulted in
"killers, rapists, and other dangerous offenders who might be successfully identified
through DNA ... to engage in further crimes against the public." Id. The Report also
noted that (at least in theory) efficient collection and processing would ensure fewer
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lies in the non-invasive "booking" procedures followed for most
arrests, which already includes fingerprinting;9J thus, swiping the
interior of the mouth with a buccal swab does not add much in terms
of invasion and inconvenience. 92
Absent a few outliers, the majority trend in cases reviewing the
taking of DNA samples at arrest views the activity and the
information gathered to be analogous to fingerprinting.93 For
example: the Second Circuit held "[t]he collection and maintenance
of DNA information, while effected through relatively more intrusive
procedures such as blood draws or buccal cheek swabs, in our view
plays the same role as fingerprinting.,,94 The Third Circuit added in
photographs for fun: "The governmental justification for [DNA]
identification, therefore, relies on no argument different in kind from
that traditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs,
but with additional force because of the potentially greater precision
of DNA sampling and matching methods.,,95 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that "the gathering of DNA information requires the
drawing of blood rather than inking and rolling a person's fingertips
does not elevate the intrusion upon the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment
interests to a level beyond minimal.,,96
State courts have followed suit,97 and while Maryland is a notable
exception to the tired and rubber-stamped "DNA is analogous to

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

wrongful convictions. Id. ("Promptly identifying the actual perpetrator of a crime
through DNA matching exonerates any other persons who might wrongfully be
suspected, accused, or convicted of the crime.").
See, e.g., Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671.
See id.
See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671.
United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Jones v.
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992».
Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995).
See, e.g., State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 280 (N.J. 2007) ("[W]e harbor no doubt
that the taking of a buccal cheek swab is a very minor physical intrusion upon the
person. . .. [T]hat intrusion is no more intrusive than the fingerprint procedure and
the taking of one's photograph that a person must already undergo as part of the
normal arrest process."); State v. Brown, 157 P.3d 301, 303 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)
(stating, "because [using a swab to take a DNA sample from the mucous membrane of
an arrestee's cheek] is akin to the fingerprinting of a person in custody, we conclude
that the seizure of the defendant's DNA did not constitute an unreasonable seizure
under the constitution").
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fingerprints" argument/8 most courts seem quick to merely balance
the defendant's interest in privacy against the state's interest in
achieving greater results in criminal investigations. 99 Unfortunately,
that conveniently traditional Fourth Amendment analysis is a
somewhat contrived and easy mark for the courts to target. Whether
out of brevity, myopia, or reluctance, the analysis of the privacy
component generally fails to reach what I think is the heart of the
matter: the information gathered. 100
This is not to say that the question of obtaining DNA samples from
arrestees should skip the Fourth Amendment analysis. Without a
doubt, this is a Fourth Amendment question and requires that lens for
proper scrutiny.IOI Indeed, most cases focus on two things: (1) the
level of intrusion in obtaining a DNA sample; and (2) the purpose of
obtaining that information. 102 On the question of intrusion, I
recognize that a buccal swab on the inside of the cheek is a relatively
minor intrusion. It is, as the Maryland Court of Appeals noted, less
physically invasive than drawing blood. 103 Moreover, I agree with
the dissent in King v. State that the "subcutaneous removal of blood
from a person's veins presents only a marginal intrusion into that
person's privacy interest, a fortiori, the insertion of a cotton swab
into a person's mouth is less of an intrusion and fairly characterized
as de minimis."I04 As to the purpose of the DNA collection, courts

98.

99.
100.

101.
102.

103.

104.

See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 569-71, 576, 42 A.3d 549, 584-86, 595 (2012)
(analyzing the existing case law and declining to equate DNA with fingerprints), cert
granted sub nom. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
E.g., Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196-1200 (N.D. Cal. 2009), ajJ'd sub
nom. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012).
See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text; infra Part II.D. Certainly, this same
argument could be made as it pertains to obtaining DNA samples from convicted
offenders, but given the wealth of opinions that note the reduced privacy protections
afforded to the convicted, this paper will not discuss that issue.
See King, 425 Md. at 562, 594, 42 A.3d at 556, 575 (applying Fourth Amendment
analysis to determine whether obtaining DNA samples from arrestees is permissible).
See id. at 577-79,584-85,589-92,42 A.3d at 565-66,569-70,573-75. A dissent in
one case also focused on the presumption of innocence related to taking the DNA of
arrestees. Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 404 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (Norris, J.,
dissenting in part), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). The dissenting judge
concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to provide justification for
abrogating the juveniles' expectation of privacy. Id.
State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 4, 857 A.2d 19, 22 (2004); see also Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966).
King, 425 Md. at 607; 42 A.3d at 583; see also United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d
387, 389, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (Barbera, J., dissenting) (noting, in a case upholding the
constitutionality of a federal statute that authorizes DNA collection from arrestees,
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seem to fall into two camps. If the court determines that the primary
purpose is identification (i.e., confirm identity or link the suspect to
the instant crime) then it seems to pass Fourth Amendment
analysis. 105
If, however, a court determines the purpose is
investigation (linking the suspect to some other crime for which there
is no probable cause), then the collection may fail the Fourth
Amendment analysis. 106
Of course the intrusion and purpose considerations are certainly
necessary to the Fourth Amendment calculus,107 but they should not
be determinative. Courts should dig deeper into the privacy prong
and stop pretending that DNA is not any different than fingerprints.
That analogy is merely a convenient illusion that fails to appreciate
the wealth of information that can be gleaned from DNA samples.
Moreover, while courts quite aptly point to the fact that the segments
of DNA relied upon for forensic profiles are considered to be noncoding junk,108 that argument conveniently sidesteps both the reality
of technological advancements and the fact that many states keep the
actual biological sample and not just the resulting profile from the
DNA, in effect holding hostage that treasure trove of information. \09
C. King of the Hill

In Maryland v. King, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the portion of Maryland's statute authorizing the state to collect
DNA samples from arrestees was constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 1\0 The Court ultimately determined that the buccal
cheek swab of an arrestee, like "fingerprinting and photographing," is
"a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

that "the intrusion occasioned by the act of collecting the DNA sample is minimal and
does not weigh significantly in [the arrestee's] favor").
See King, 425 Md. at 570,572-73,42 A.3d at 561-63.
See id.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
See King, 425 Md. at 579,583,42 A.3d at 566, 569 (2011).
Id. at 583, 595, 42 A.3d at 569, 576; see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). In contrast, the Maryland Court of
Appeals determined that law enforcement had no need for DNA to link King to the
crime for which he was arrested. King, 425 Md. at 556, 42 A.3d at 553.
Consequently, because fingerprints and photographs were sufficient to identify King,
the state lacked probable cause to compel a DNA sample for this arrest. Id.
Accordingly, the court found the statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the
case. Id. The court noted "some trepidation as to the facial constitutionality" of the
statute but declined to go so far as to find it facially unconstitutional. !d.
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Fourth Amendment."!!! This was a complete 180-degree departure
from the opinion below, which took great care to summarize the
Fourth Amendment landscape in obtaining DNA samples from
arrestees 112 and acknowledged that it would be in the minority of
courts by finding the collections unconstitutional. 113 Notably, the
Maryland Count of Appeals rejected the fingerprint-DNA analogy
that the Supreme Court majority would later wholeheartedly
embrace.!!4 Couched in the privacy analysis, the King Court agreed
that DNA is more than a determination of identity. 115
Rather than finding that the DNA sample taken from arrestees
contains "highly sensitive information coded in their genes,,,116 the
Court labeled DNA as primarily a method of identifying arrestees.!!7
While courts quibble over identification versus investigation, they
touch upon some of the more significant, but often misunderstood,
issues surrounding the collection of DNA. The misnomer "DNA
fingerprinting"IIS contributed to the notion that the state only collects
these samples as a means to identify. But as one court noted, "[t]he
collection of a DNA sample ... does not 'identify' an [arrestee or
pre-trial detainee] any more than a search of his home does-it
merely collects more and more information about that [arrestee or
pre-trial detainee] that can be used to investigate unsolved past or
future crimes."119 This is an incredibly valid point, but the use of
collected DNA samples goes beyond the Minority Report aspect of
solving past and future crimes. 120
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

115.
116.
117.
118.

119.
120.

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
King, 425 Md. at 562-65, 42 A.3d at 556-58.
Id. at 573-93, 42 A.3d at 563-75.
Compare King, 425 Md. at 562-65,42 A.3d at 556-58, with Maryland v. King, 133 S.
Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
King, 425 Md. at 594-96, 42 A.3d at 576-77.
United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,421 (3d Cir. 2011) (Rendell, J., dissenting).
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
Sir Alec Jeffreys is credited as the "inventor" of so-called "DNA fingerprinting."
Giles Newton, Discovering DNA Fingerprinting, HUM. GENOME (Apr. 2, 2004),
http://genome.wellcome.ac. uk/doc_ wtd020877 .html.
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813, 857 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
The Mitchell dissent also acknowledged (and the King court echoed) that the presence
of an automatic expungement provision bolstered the conclusion that arrestees do
have a larger privacy interest:
If the Government's real interest were in maintaining records of
arrestees' identities, there would be no need to expunge those
records upon an acquittal or failure to file charges against the
arrestee. Indeed, this statutory provision serves as an admission
that the fact of conviction, not of mere arrest, justifies a finding
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In effect, the fingerprint analogy is tenuous at best and fully
inapposite at worst. Indeed, the King court culled through the various
opinions to find the hallmarks of that platitude. The only problem is
that many of the opinions that voice concern over the larger practice
and collective good of obtaining DNA samples seem to be dissenting
opinions (with a smattering of a few minority-majority opinions).121
One judge compared the process to "the Government seiz[ing]
personal medical information about you but ... only us[ing] the
subset of that information that serves to identify yoU.,,122 The
Sczubelek court observed that collecting DNA "requires production
of evidence below the body surface which is not subject to public
view,,,123 while the Maryland Court of Appeals in King observed that
fingerprints are "accessible readily on the surface of the skin.,,124
Yet another dissent noted that a "fingerprint is an impression left
by the depositing of oil upon contact between a surface and the
fission ridges of the fingers," while DNA "stores and reveals massive
amounts of personal, private data about an individual." 125 It
appears-perhaps only to allay their own concerns-that courts time
and again accept that DNA sampling is merely part of "routine
booking procedures.,,126 Even majority opinions that hold a tight grip
on the fingerprint-DNA analogy acknowledge that there is more than
meets the eye.127 For example, the Virginia Supreme Court stated
that a DNA sample is more revealing, but ultimately concluded, as so
many other courts have, that it "is no different in character than
acquiring fingerprints upon arrest.,,128

121.

122.
123.
124.
125.

126.
127.
128.

that an individual has a diminished expectation of privacy in his
DNA.
id.at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting); King, 425 Md. at 581, 42 A.3d at 568.
See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting); United States v. Sczubelek,
402 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, J., dissenting); United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 424.
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 197-98 (McKee, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Mills, 686
F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1982».
King, 425 Md. at 582, 42 A.3d at 568. (citing Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 424-25 (Rendell,
J., dissenting».
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 407 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (Norris, J., dissenting)
(quoting Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 221; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 n.3 (Gould, J.,
concurring» (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012).
See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013); Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413;
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702,705 (Va. 2007).
See generally Anderson, 653 S .E.2d at 705.
Id.
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Mirroring that conclusion, the King Court openly embraced the
analogy between fingerprints and DNA samples. 129 The dissent,
however, vigorously rejects this analogy by highlighting the major
distinctions between fingerprint and DNA analysis. 130 It does (and
should) matter that a "person's entire genetic makeup and history is
forcibly seized and maintained in a government file, subject only to
the law's direction that it not be improperly used.,,131 To put it
bluntly, what lies beneath matters.

D. A Hunk ofJunk
The majority in King embraces the fingerprint-DNA analogy
propagated by other courts. 132 Courts often note that only nonidentifying "junk DNA" is used in the analysis and development of
forensic profiles. 133 It is true that the thirteen loci were chosen "in
response to congressional concern over privacy protections, because
they are considered 'non-coding' [segments of] DNA" and do not
reveal any diagnostic, characteristic, or other "private information.,,134
The resulting DNA profile used in databases is absent of any
identifying information, including fingerprints, criminal history, or

129. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). The Court goes so far as to describe
DNA identification as "an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting in many
ways," noting that "DNA is a markedly more accurate form of identifying arrestees."
Id. at 1976 ("A suspect who has changed his facial features to evade photographic
identification or even one who has undertaken the more arduous task of altering his
fingerprints cannot escape the revealing power of his DNA.").
130. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1987 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
notes three major distinctions between DNA and fingerprints: (I) DNA analysis takes
months to complete in comparison to the mere half hour needed to analyze
fingerprints; (2) DNA databases contain no personal identifying information, whereas
fingerprint databases contain detailed identification information; and (3) DNA
samples are compared against crime scene evidence to help solve crimes, while
fingerprints are not compared against the database of known prints. Id. The
Maryland Court of Appeals in King seemed persuaded that DNA "remains distinct
from a fingerprint" since "[t]he information derived from a fingerprint is related only
to physical characteristics," while a DNA sample "contains within it unarguably much
more than a person's identity." See King, 425 Md. at 596-96, 42 A.3d at 576-77.
And while the Maryland DNA Collection Act "restricts the DNA profile to identifying
information only"-as do similar laws in other states-the Maryland Court of Appeals
in King is right to "not tum a blind eye to the vast genetic treasure map that remains in
the DNA sample retained by the State." Id. at 586,42 A.3d at 577.
131. King, 425 Md. at 596, 42 A.3d at 577 (quoting State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1,50,857
A.2d 19,48-49 (2004) (Wilner, J., concurring».
132. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
133. King, 425 Md. at 567-68 & n.17, 42 A.3d at 560 & n.l7 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
134. Id. at 567--68, 42 A.3d at 560.
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photographs. 135 And while this seems to sanitize the process, making
it more palatable, that biological sample generally remains in the
custody of the state because further analysis will be needed when and
if there is a match. 136
While we may be able to sleep better at night telling ourselves that
it is just "junk," that assumption may be eroding quickly.137 Despite
being colloquially labeled "junk," geneticists continue to argue that
even non-coding junk DNA is active and useful. 138 Technology does
not wait for the legal system to catch up with it. From DNA to GPS,
"the boon that new technology will provide to law enforcement, is an
engraved invitation to future expansion.,,139 As for junk DNA, the
Maryland Court of Appeals in King left us with the ominous
statement that there is "considerable current debate as to whether
these 'non-coding' or 'junk' DNA provide no predictive genetic
information. ,,140
This is not merely conjecture of things to come. Recently, by
virtue of a federally funded project (there is some irony to that),
scientists discovered that our genetic material
is packed with at least four million gene switches that reside
in bits of DNA that once were dismissed as 'junk" but that
tum out to play critical roles in controlling how cells, organs
and other tissues behave. 141
This advancement has "enormous implications" on both the
medical and criminal justice fronts. 142 If the "junk" DNA controls
our genes, then it provides an "annotated road map" and now reveals
far more than the innocuous short tandem repeats (STRs) we thought
135.
136.
137.
138.

139.

140.

141.

142.

Id. at 568, 42 A.3d at 560.
See id.
Id. at 568 n.17, 42 A.3d at 560 n.17.
Brief of Genetics, Genomics and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 25-26, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12207).
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 410 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (Norris, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, 1.,
dissenting)), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012).
King, 425 Md. at 568 n.17, 42 A.3d at 560 n.17 (citing Simon A. Cole, Is the "Junk"
DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 54, 54 (2007), available at
http://www.law.northwestem.edullawreview/colloquy/2007123/, in support of the
continued scholarly debate on the matter of "junk" DNA).
Gina Kolata, Study Discovers Road Map o/DNA: A Key to Biology, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6,2012, at AI.
Id.; see also Cole, supra note 140, at 54-56.
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we were using. 143 One researcher labeled it as a "Google Maps" that
can be a "stunning resource."I44
While this is truly a breakthrough, other research has hinted at the
importance of junk DNA. 14S British scientists noted in a study a few
years ago that "the standard DNA profile contains a subtle signature
which can be linked to a person's susceptibility to Type 1
diabetes.,,146 Alec Jeffreys, the godfather of DNA fingerprinting, 147
and part of the British research team, noted that "further troubling
links between DNA fingerprints and disease will emerge as scientists
probe the completed draft of the human genome.,,148 If it is true that
"[h]uman DNA is 'a lot more active than we expected, and there are a
lot more things happening than we expected,,,,149 then perhaps we
should reconsider using the "junk" feature of select DNA as an
argument in support of the continued expansion of DNA databases.
Even with these advances, courts seem reticent to consider the
possibility that the DNA profiles currently warehoused in databases
around the country contain more infonnation than we bargained
for. ISO After all, proponents of databases sold us a bill of goods that
included the assurance these database profiles "need be no more
infonnative than an ordinary fingerprint."lsl Courts have repeatedly
relied on the representations that the "molecular sequences at DNA
loci ... are not indicative of an individual's personal traits or

143. Kolata, supra note 141, at A3. The length variations of STRs ultimately detennine
the significance of the genetic infonnation conveyed. Brief of Genetics, Genomics
and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2930, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207) ("One must ask whether
the length variations of the particular STRs actually convey meaningful information,
and they seem to contain less trait-related infonnation than a photograph of an
arrestee.").
144. Id. (quoting Dr. Eric Lander).
145. Id. at AI; see also Sumitra Pithawala et aI., Junk DNA: An Evolutionary Trash or
Nature's Best Bequest?, 5 LV.P. J. GENETICS & EVOLUTION 55, 55-56, 59-63 (2012).
146. Candice Roman-Santos, Concerns Associated with Expanding DNA Databases, 2
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH L.J. 267, 291-92 (2010).
147. See supra note 118.
148. Roman-Santos, supra note 146, at 291-92.
149. Kolata, supra note 141, at A3 (quoting Ewan Birney).
150. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 570-71, 42 A.3d 549, 561, cert. granted sub nom.
Maryland v. King 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012); Roman-Santos, supra note 146, at 284-85.
151. Sei! King, 425 Md. at 609, 42 A.3d at 585 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Raines, 383 Md. 1,45,857 A.2d 19,45-47 (2004) (Raker, J., concurring».
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propensities.,,152 But the profile is not "like a social security
number ... assigned by chance, not by the federal government.,,153
It would be more honest to say that we simply do not know
whether the procedures by which DNA samples are tested will
inevitably "disclose intimate genetic information.,,154 Given the
progression of science and the new territories of the human genome
we continue to uncover, those loci may ultimately reveal certain
genetic traits or predispositions. ISS Even without probing into the
function of junk DNA, we have begun to data mine existing
databases to search for racial commonalities and frequencies within
the confines of the thirteen CODIS 10ci.156 Consequently, as science
progresses, so, too, should our understanding of what exactly it is we
are taking when we extract DNA from arrestees. DNA is not a
fingerprint. It never has been, and it never will be.157

III. DNA Policy in Maryland: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
According to the Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Control
and Prevention website, there are currently 106,721 CODIS samples
in Maryland's database. 158 Of those, 1,514 samples were added
during the first five months of 2013. 159 To date, there have been
2,880 hits resulting from the Maryland CODIS databank. 160
Notwithstanding the Maryland Court of Appeal's decision in King,
Maryland was able to obtain a stay of the impact of the case, and it
continues to collect and include arrestee samples in its CODIS
database. 161 Since Maryland began collecting DNA from arrestees in
152. Id.
153. Raines, 383 Md. at 45,857 A.2d at 45-46 (quoting D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith,
DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for PopulationWide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REv. 413,431(2003)).
154. King, 425 Md. at 608, 42 A.3d at 584.
155. See Roman-Santos, supra note 146, at 292 (quoting Sir Alex Jeffreys).
156. See, e.g., Bruce Budowle et a\., Population Data on the Thirteen CODIS Core Short
Tandem Repeat Loci in African Americans, u.s. Caucasians, Hispanics, Bahamians,
Jamaicans, and Trinidadians, 44 FORENSIC SCI. 1277, 1277 (1999), available at
Iibrary-resources.cqu.edu.aulJFSIPDF/vol_44/iss_ 6/JFS44634.pdf.
157. My quibble with the fingerprint-DNA analogy should not be confused with, nor does
it touch upon, the issues surrounding the actual analysis and interpretation of DNA
evidence. The problems with that analysis and interpretation are better raised in a
separate article.
158. DNA Statistics, GOVERNOR'S OFF. CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dna/statistics.php (last updated May 28,2013).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1,3 (2012); see also DNA Statistics, supra note 158.
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2009, there have been 245 charged offender hits that resulted in
seventy-nine arrests. 162 Yet, with the specter of King lurking,
Maryland has contemplated some significant changes to its DNA
database laws. 163
A. The Good? Changes in Maryland's DNA Database Provisions

At first blush, Maryland's DNA database provisions seem to be
very protective of privacy (if you set aside the fact that its policy is to
collect DNA from a wide array of offenders).I64 Section 2504(a)(3)(ii) currently provides for notice to individuals charged with
a violent crime or burglary that their records may be expunged in
accordance with section 2_511. 165 In pertinent part, section 2-511(a)
provides:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection,
any DNA samples and records generated as part of a
criminal investigation or prosecution shall be destroyed or
expunged automatically from the State DNA data base 166 if:
(i) a criminal action begun against the individual
relating to the crime does not result in a conviction
of the individual [.] 167
Section 2-511 further provides that the DNA record must be
expunged from any database that it was uploaded to, including local,
state and federal databases. 168 Thus, Maryland appears to be on the
forefront of putting the onus on the State to destroy the sample and
expunge the DNA profiles of persons who are ultimately not
convicted. 169 This is in sharp contrast to the vast majority of other
162. DNA Statistics, supra note 158.
163. Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011) with revised § 2504 (effective Jan. 1,2014).
164. Issue Papers: 2013 Legislative Session, MD. DEP'T LEGIS. SERVS., 180 (2012);
Maryland DNA Legislation, GOVERNOR'S OFF. CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dnallegislation.php (last updated Jan. 12,2011).
165. PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3)(ii).
166. There are, however, local DNA databanks, and many automatic expungement
provisions do not extend to those DNA databanks. Jessica D. Gabel and Stephen
Mercer, Shadow Dwellers: The Under-regulated World of Local DNA Databanks, 89
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014).
167. Id. § 2-511(a)(I)(i) (emphasis added).
168. Id. § 2-511(c) ("Any DNA record expunged in accordance with this section shall be
expunged from every data base into which it has been entered, including local, State,
and federal data bases.").
169. Julie Samuels et aI., Collecting DNA from Arrestees: Implementation Lessons. NAT'L
INST. JUST. 1. June 2012, at 18,23.
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states that have some sort of purge mechanism, but require a formal
request that the profile be expunged from the system. 170
A closer look at the legislative history surrounding the Maryland
statute, however, gives us a glimpse of what could have been.
Section 2-511 (and other provisions of the Maryland DNA database
law) originally had a sunset date of December 31, 2013.171 If that
sunset provision had not been repealed, the automatic purge
obligation that I applauded would have disappeared. 172 Starting on
January 1,2014:
An individual whose DNA record or profile is included in
the statewide DNA data base system and whose DNA
sample is stored in the statewide DNA repository may
request that information be expunged on the grounds that
the conviction that resulted in the inclusion meets the
expungement criteria specified in § 10-105 or § 10-106 of
the Criminal Procedure Article. 173

Under this new provision, the state would no longer have had an
obligation to either destroy the sample or expunge the resulting DNA
profile from the database. 174 Moreover, the scope of the purge would
have only applied to the state database and not any other database to
which the "DNA record, DNA sample, or other identifiable
information" may have been added. 175 By ultimately rejecting these
proposed changes, Maryland remains a more defense friendly pioneer
by keeping both the automatic expungement requirement and
preventing the sample, profile and other identifiable information
from lingering in other databases. 176 Had these proposed changes
come to fruition it might have been the appropriate time to say
"shame on Maryland," but it would only have been following the lead
of its sister states.

170. Jd.; e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:614(A) (2012) (permitting "a person whose DNA

17l.

172.
173.

174.
175.

176.

record or profile has been included in the data base or data bank" to "request that his
record or profile be removed").
Act of May 13,2008, § 4, 2008 Md. Laws 337.
Compare PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a), with § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2003).
§ 2-511 (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added).
Compare § 2-511(a), with § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2003)
§ 2-511(c) (LexisNexis 2003).
Compare § 2-511, with § 2-511 (LexisNexis 2003).
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B. The Bad: Family Matters
Maryland also seemed poised to be on the forefront of ethical
considerations with its wholesale prohibition on familial DNA
searches. Section 2-506(d) specifically prohibits the "search of the
statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an
offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a
biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample"
was taken. 177 Familial searching is a database process by which
investigators move past looking for a perfect match between samples
and instead seek out partial matches between crime scene DNA
profiles and the offender/arrestee DNA index. 178 By looking for the
imperfect match, the search may identify in the database a relative of
the target suspect (sometimes referred to as the "pivot"), who is not
in the index. 179 An interview with the pivot may then provide enough
information to ultimately lead investigators to the target. 180
While some states-Califomia l81 and Colorado l82-have active
familial search policies in place, Maryland specifically declined to
participate in the practice. 183 In a previous article, I speculated that
the reason for Maryland's ban on familial searches was more likely

177. § 2-506. For a discussion of Maryland's no familial search policy, see generally
Gabel, supra note 28, at 22. Section 2-506 only references the statewide DNA data
base, leaving no "restrictions on the ways local police can use their own DNA
databases." Ian Duncan, A Push for DNA Collection Changes, BALT. SUN, Mar. 2,
2013, at 2A. Although section 2-506(d) proclaims to prohibit familial searching, the
"statute leaves open one common alternative approach, which is to allow reporting of
inadvertent partial matches." Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 37, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12207),2013 WL 476046.
178. Familial Searching, FBI, http://www.tbi.gov/about-usllablbiometric-analysis/codis/
familial-searching (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). New developments in DNA technology
and techniques, like familial searching, "have been implemented without express
legislative permission or judicial oversight." Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic
Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 40, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
I (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046.
179. Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in Forensic
Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 263,
269 (2006).
180. Jd. at 263.
181. CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIV. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, INFORMATION BULLETIN: DNA
PARTIAL MATCH (CRIME SCENE DNA PROFILE TO OFFENDER) POLICY, (Apr. 25, 2008),
available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_ attachments/press/pdfs/n 1548_08-bfs-0 I.pdf.
182. COLO. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DNA FAMILIAL RESEARCH POLICY, (Oct. 22,2009),
available
at
http://www.denverda.orgIDNA_DocumentslPolicies/
CO%20fs%20policy.pdf.
183. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (LexisNexis 2011).
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the product of "political pressure than constitutional misgivings or
scientific uncertainty.,,184 I predicted-despite ethical misgivingsthat familial searching practices were unavoidable "crime fighting
tools of the future ... here to stay in some form or another.,,185 It
seems that Maryland seriously considered surrendering to the
addictive lure of familial DNA searches.
The proposed new section 2-506 apparently lost subsection (d),
which prohibited familial searching. 186 It does not take a quixotic
leap to see that the absence of the exclusion would permit the practice
by virtue of its silence on the subject. 187 It would also mean that
Maryland would be able to perform familial searches without the
restrictions that other states have put in place. 188 For example,
California requires a certain number of alleles in common before any
additional investigation can be done. 189 Removing the familial search
limitation would have enabled Maryland to run unbridled database
trawls, but Maryland lawmakers ultimately rejected this proposed
change by removing the statute's sunset provision. 190 The ability to
hunt for relatives raises serious concerns about the privacy of and
protections afforded to individuals who are not suspects but who may
be related to someone in the database. 191
Familial searches, however, represent yet another extension of the
initial purpose of DNA databases. At a minimum, if Maryland plans
to conduct familial searches in its database, it should have specific
provisions regarding how such searches are to be conducted.
Moreover, there are larger considerations at issue such as the fact that
databases "were meant to identify the perpetrator who left the

184. Gabel, supra note 28, at 43.
185. ld.
186. Compare PUB. SAFETY § 2-506, with revised § 2-506. (effective Jan. 1,2014).
187. See § 2-506 (effective Jan. 1,2014).
188. Compare § 2-506 (effective Jan. 1, 2014) (abrogating Maryland's restriction of
familial DNA searches), with DNA PARTIAL MATCH POLICY, supra note 181
(California's familial DNA search policy), and DNA FAMILIAL RESEARCH POLICY,
supra note 182 (Colorado's familial DNA search policy).
189. DNA PARTIAL MATCH POLICY, supra note 181 ("When a partial match occurs that has
at least 15 shared STR alleles with an offender, DOJ will contact the local
laboratory's CODIS administrator to confirm that the case is not yet solved. If the
case is still active, the case investigator should be notified of the partial match by the
local CODIS laboratory and the process defined in the policy will be followed upon
request.").
190. See PUB. SAFETY § 2-506 (effective Jan. 1,2014); 2013 Md. Laws 431.
191. Haimes, supra note 179, at 269-71.
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sample, not the family members of the perpetrator.,,192 We cannot
ignore that genomic research demonstrates that humans are "99.9
percent identical at the DNA level, irrespective of gender, race or
ethnicity.,,\93 Given that, at a molecular level we will only find more
genetic links and more commonalities rather than the differences that
DNA databases are supposedly built upon. 194 If employed in a
haphazard approach, familial searches may ultimately ensnare
innocent people and hamper criminal investigations.

C. The Ugly: Research without Borders
Some of the rather bombastic reasoning telling us that DNA
databases are safe, effective, and present no intrusion into the lives of
the average person is false. 195 After all, so the false logic goes, only
criminals (or criminals-in-the-making) are caught within the snares of
the database. 196 The proliferation of databases, however, is not
limited to use in criminal investigations. 197 Genetic data is also
compiled and maintained for medical research. 198 In fact, Maryland
mingles the two. The Maryland public safety code sanctions the use
of DNA information for "research" and maintenance of a "population
data base.,,199 In addition to the crime-related provisions, the statute
192. Gabel, supra note 28, at 49 (emphasis omitted). With DNA warehoused in databanks
with little to no judicial involvement, law enforcement officers "use genetic material
to draw conclusions about the DNA profiles of offenders' relatives." Brief of 14
Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 36,
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046.
193. Michael Hadjiargyrou, Letter to the Editor, Our Shared DNA, N.Y. TiMES, June 23,
2012, at A18. The author, a molecular biologist, opined that "we are all brothers and
sisters ... the more we look into our genealogy." Id.
194. See id.
195. Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California's Proposition 69: A Dangerous
Precedentfor Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279,283-84 (2005).
196. See Samuels et aI., supra note 169, at 19. Some forensic evidence professors suggest
that procuring DNA samples from arrestees is not necessary to "exonerate the
innocent," because often the true perpetrator would be listed in a convicted offender
DNA database, thus removing the need for arrestee DNA samples. Brief of 14
Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21-23,
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (No. 12-207),2013 WL 476046.
197. Mary McCarthy, Am I My Brother's Keeper?: Familial DNA Searches in the TwentyFirst Century, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 381, 410 (2011).
198. E.g., Yael Bregman-Eschet, Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls Our
Genetic PrivaCy, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 1,2 (2006-2007).
199. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-505(a)(5)(i), 2-509(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
Moreover, there is concern that crime victim data may also be included in the
population data base. See § 2-501 (i)(3) (providing that a DNA sample encompasses
"body fluid or tissue" that is "submitted to the statewide data base system for testing
as part of a criminal investigation"). Crime victims then run the risk of being twice
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also permits the state to utilize genetic samples "for research and
administrative purposes.,,200 The illustrative research-related uses
include "development of a population data base after personal
identifying information is removed.,,201 The provisions addressing
the population database also mandate removal of all personal
information prior to entering the data. 202 There is mounting evidence,
however, that simply deleting identifying information is insufficient
to protect privacy. 203
In a widely-reported study, investigators were able to identify both
individual donors and their families from "anonymous" genetic
data. 204 Alarmingly, the authors found "that data release, even of a
few markers, from one person can spread through deep genealogical
ties.,,205 Even a small data-leak could ultimately identify people who
lacked any social ties to the donor. 206 Although perhaps the most
disconcerting, this study is not the first to demonstrate the
vulnerability of genetic information. 207 These findings suggest that
maintaining the anonymity of genetic information may be impossible.
Moreover, the authors speculate that privacy breaches will become
both easier and more common. 208
As a consequence of the extracurricular activities sponsored by
Maryland's DNA law/09 Maryland seems to be following other states
and the federal govemment down the path of "mission creep.,,2iO The
difficulties in protecting private individuals' information raise a
number of vexing problems. Individuals with particular gene

200.
201.
202.
203.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

victimized. First, in the initial incident, and again should their information be
compromised.
See id. § 2-505(a)(5).
Id. § 2-505(a)(5)(i).
Id. § 2-509(b).
See Veronique Lacapra, Anonymity in Genetic Research Can Be Fleeting, NPR (Jan.
17, 2013, 3:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/healthl2013/01l17/169609144/
anonymity-in-genetic-research-can-be-fleeting.
Melissa Gymrek et aI., IdentifYing Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI.
321,324 (2013); Lacapra, supra note 203.
Gymrek et aI., supra note 204, at 324.
Id.
Id. at 321. The researchers here did not repeat the exact method used, but they noted
that the resources were all publicly available.
Lacapra, supra note 203.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
See David Schultz, It's Legal for Some Insurers to Discriminate Based on Genes,
NPR (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/healthl2013/011l7/
169634045/some-types-of-insurance-can-discriminate-based-on-genes.
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sequences may face discrimination.2lI This type of discrimination
could occur in a number of forms. For example, companies may
refuse to issue life insurance, disability insurance, or long-term care
policies to individuals based upon particular genes.212 Yet research
suggests that genetic variations noted in DNA databases are not likely
213
In addition to insurance risks,
to help diagnose or predict diseases.
there is the grave danger of misuse of this information to wrongfully
and indelibly stigmatize individuals as criminals.
Imagine a
Huxleyan nightmare in which science is purportedly able to
determine the propensity for crime or violence through certain
genetic markers. Forget judge and jury, instead pseudoscience will
determine the fate of individuals-possibly for the duration of their
lives. Given the near-religious embrace of DNA, this is not a farfetched concern. 214
IV. ALL DNA IS IDENTIFYING, BUT NOT ALL
IDENTIFICATION IS AS HARMLESS AS
FINGERPRINTING: CAUTION FOR THE FUTURE
Before we started expanding the use of DNA databases, we should
have considered three things: (1) would expansion increase
investigative outcomes; (2) are those outcomes worth the
consequences; and (3) is the advancement of DNA technology fixed?
21l. See id.
212. !d. There is a federallaw prohibiting health insurance companies from discriminating
based on genetic data. Genetic Infonnation Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-233, sec. 101(a), § 1182(b), 122 Stat. 881, 883 (2008)). The provision is
limited solely to health insurance. See id.
213. Brief of Genetics, Genomics and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 20-21, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12207) ("[C]o-inheritance of a marker and genetic disease tells researchers that a gene
mutation causing the disease lies near the STR marker. But the STR marker in no way
'causes' the disease."). Currently, no published research supports the use of database
records of genetic variations as a means of disease diagnosis or prediction, because
there is no beneficial link between CODIS alleles and genetic traits. ld. at 23-25.
214. WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, THE POTENTIAL FOR ERROR IN FORENSIC DNA TESTING (AND
How THAT COMPLICATES THE USE OF DNA DATABASES FOR CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION) 2 (2008) available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
pageDocumentsIH4T5EOYUZl.pdf Indeed, there is recent and on-going precedent
for such a practice. The so-called "psychopath test" is often dispositive as to matters
of parole and influential as to sentencing. Alix Spiegel, Can a Test Really Tell Who's
a Psychopath?, NPR (May 26, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2011l05/261136619689/can-a-test-really-tell-whos-a-psychopatho The test has even
influenced whether the death penalty is administered. ld. This use of the test remains
pervasive-even though the test's creator has expressed concern over the practice. Ira
Glass, The Psychopath Test, CHI. PUB. MEDIA (May 27,2011) (interviewing the test's
creator Bob Hare).
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While the first may have been a no-brainer, it seems that we have not
given any real thought to the other two. It seems likely that with the
Supreme Court's decision this year, DNA databases and the
populations housed within them will continue to explode in
numbers. 215 As citizens, DNA and the concept of turning it over
freely has become as routine as giving private information over to the
likes of Facebook, LinkedIn, and other social media outlets?16 We
are indifferent to the number of situations that call for the submission
of genetic material to medical providers, businesses selling at-home
genetic tests, ancestry websites, and other public and private
institutions. The reality is that troves of our genetic data are
"persistent and widely shared" and incredibly difficult for us later to
"access, to verify, or to correct.,,217
It should not surprise us, then, that the criminal justice system
wants to collect DNA from an ever-increasing spectrum of people
who come into contact with it. 218 The notion of privacy and the
presumption of innocence are now blurred figures in this landscape.
These concerns do not pertain to simply the collection of DNA
profiles and samples, but also to the other information that may be
kept. 219
While criminal investigations and medical research
previously operated in different genetic spheres, those spheres are
starting to converge. When DNA is collected on arrest and uploaded
into the database, it is not simply translated into an identity-free
criminal bar code. 220 Ultimately, that digitized profile must link to a
name, to a location, and possibly to a criminal record. 221 Other
records may also be available, especially for released offenders
because police must be able to track that person down if there is a hit
in the database later. 222 Ultimately, we may find that when police do

215. United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, 1.,
dissenting).
216. Cj United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 848-49 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
217. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-366, CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1988).
218. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 872-73.
219. See, e.g., 1. Clay Smith, Jr., The Precarious Implications of DNA Profiling, 55 U.
Pm. L. REv. 865, 886-87 (1994).
220. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 721, 752 (2007).
221. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819-20, 838 (Reinhardt, 1., dissenting).

222. Id.
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contact a database offender they may also be able to tell that person
his or her predisposition to kidney disease. 223
In the wake of the King case, the fingerprint-DNA analogy has
overstayed its welcome. Nonetheless, it seems that it is not slated for
retirement any time soon despite enduring concerns about the
expansion of DNA collection. 224 If the extension of DNA databases
is in fact inevitable, then it should likewise be foreseeable that DNA
technology may advance and outpace the restrictions once thought
sufficient to keep databases sufficiently void of identifying
information. As for now, it seems we would rather be content to
operate databases at the margins of technology and tolerate a certain
margin of error when things go awry. 225 The criminal.iustice system
hungers for the ability to solve crime and convict the guilty.
Databases certainly feed that insatiable beast, but we need to respect
that DNA is not the tame dormouse we once thought it to be.

223. Id. at 850.
224. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's
judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solving more crimes; then
again, so would the taking of DNA samples from anyone who flies on an
airplane ... [b Jut I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties
would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.").
225. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on A"est, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 455, 507 (2001).

